Coded caching schemes on broadcast networks with user caches help to offload traffic from peak times to off-peak times by prefetching information from the server to the users during off-peak times and thus serving the users more efficiently during peak times using coded transmissions. We consider the problem of secretive coded caching which was proposed recently, in which a user should not be able to decode any information about any file that the user has not demanded. We propose a new secretive coded caching scheme which has a lower average rate compared to the existing state-of-the-art scheme, for the same memory available at the users. The proposed scheme is based on exploiting the presence of common demands between multiple users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Caching has historically proved to be a significant aid in reducing the load in information flow networks, both wired and wireless. Recently, in the landmark paper [1] , a novel coded caching scheme was proposed for a network consisting of a single server containing N files each with F bits connected via a single noiseless broadcast link to K users. Each user is also equipped with a cache of size M (which can store MF bits). Under this scenario, the authors of [1] showed substantial reduction in the rate, i.e., the load on the shared link compared to the conventional caching scheme, by transmitting coded subfiles in the delivery phase. Further refinements and extensions to this fundamental problem have been made since (for instance see [2] - [5] ). The idea of exploiting commonality of demands between the users to minimise the average rate and the peak rate was presented in [2] , where the authors showed the exact optimality of their scheme for uncoded cache placement in the original setup of [1] .
The problem of secretive coded caching was introduced in [6] . In secretive coded caching, the cache content and the transmissions are required to be such that each user can decode only the requested file by that user, and no information about other files. The general achievability scheme of [6] first encodes the files using a secret sharing scheme. Using the file-shares in the place of subfiles in the scheme of [1] , and with added secret keys in the caching and delivery phase, the scheme of [6] ensures that information leakage of files to unintended users does not happen. A lower bound on the rate based on cut-sets is also derived in [6] .
In this work, we consider the problem of secretive coded caching and give an achievable scheme which has a lower average rate compared to the previous scheme in [6] . In order to present our scheme, we first analyse the leakage properties of a coded caching scheme modified from the general achievable scheme in [6] by removing the keys from the transmissions. The reason for analysing this 'keyless' scheme is to understand which transmissions are redundant and can be removed from the scheme of [6] (thus decreasing the rate), without compromising on secrecy. Using our analysis, and based on insights from [2] , we then propose a modified scheme which achieves an average rate better than [6] exploiting the commonality between the user demands.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall the relevant results for secretive coded caching from [6] . We also give few definitions required for our purpose and summarise the main intuition behind this work. In Section III, we analyse the 'keyless' transmission scheme modified from that of [6] , while keeping the same cache content. We derive the exact properties of the coded transmissions which result in leakage of file shares to unintended users. Using these results, in Section IV, we propose our secretive coded caching scheme based on a simple modification of the scheme in [6] and derive the improvements in average rate.
Notations: For a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1, ..., n}. For some set B and some b ∈ B, we denote by B\b the set B\{b}. For some element c, we denote the set B ∪ {c} as B ∪ c. Throughout the paper we assume that n m is zero, if m > n.
Due to space considerations, we omit some proofs and explanations in this paper. An expanded version of this paper is available in [7] .
II. SECRETIVE CODED CACHING
We recall the problem setup and relevant results from [6] . As with [1] , the cache network is a single server connected to the users via a broadcast link, with the parameters N, K, M denoting the number of files (each of size F bits) at the server, the number of users, and the cache available at each user. We denote the files at the server as W k : k ∈ [N ], which are assumed to be independent random variables each distributed uniformly over [2 F ]. The cache content at a user k (k ∈ [K]), denoted by random variable Z k , takes values from [2 MF ] according to some function of the N files during the cache placement phase. The user demands d k : k ∈ [K] during the delivery phase are collected in a K-length vector d. The server then transmits a message X d ∈ [2 R d F ] which is a function of the files and the cache contents. The coded caching scheme is defined by the quantities X d and Z k , k ∈ [K], and the quantity R d is called the rate of the coded caching scheme given d. Following [2] , we denote by N e (d) the number of unique demands in d. Let U ⊆ [K] denote a set of leaders, such that |U | = N e (d) and d u1 = d u2 for any distinct u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . We also give the following definition for use in the present and forthcoming sections.
Definition 1 (Demand profile and Demand vector). Let A be a subset of users, demanding m unique demands (m ≤ |A|) in total. We define the demand profile d p (A) of A as the mtuple of integers such that the i th value in the tuple denotes the number of users demanding the i th most requested file. We also define the demand vector of A, denoted by d(A), as the ordered |A|-tuple of demanded files by the users in A. We say that two demand vectors (of two sets A, A ) are equal (denoted by d(A) = d(A )) if they are equal as vectors except for a permutation. Note that d([K]) = d, the vector containing all the demands, which we shall refer to simply as the demand vector.
In [6] , the authors define the notion of information leakage to quantify the amount of information that unintended users can decode information about files not demanded by it as follows.
where I(; ) is mutual information, and W [N ] \d k is the set of files except for W d k .
We refer to a placement and delivery scheme such that all users can recover their demands and L = 0 as a perfectly secretive coded caching scheme, or simply a secretive coded caching scheme. Assuming uniform distribution on the vector d ∈ [N ] K , the average rate of a secretive coded caching scheme is defined as the expectation E d (R d ).
The pair (M, R avg ) is said to be secretively achievable if there exists a average rate R avg secretive coded caching scheme. In [6] , the authors presented a secretive coded caching scheme, which we refer to as the SCC keys scheme throughout this paper, achieving the below rate.
where t ∈ {0, 1, ..., K −2} and R keys avg is the average rate of the scheme. The convex envelope of these memory-rate points for any general 1 ≤ M ≤ N (K − 1) is also shown to be achieved by memory sharing.
We now present briefly the general achievability scheme from [6] (with rate as in (1)) for M values in the set M = { Nt K−t + 1 : t = 1, ..., K − 2}. We do not present the achievability scheme for M ∈ {1, N(K −1)} given in [6] as it is not relevant to this work. The scheme of [6] is as follows.
each) such that the file W i can be completely recovered from all the K t shares, but no information about W i is revealed by accessing any K−1 t−1 shares. The shares of W i are indexed by
, |A| = t}. In the placement phase, for any user k and any file W i , the share S A i is placed in the cache of k if k ∈ A. In addition to shares, for each subset A ⊂ [K] such that |A| = t + 1, an independent and uniformly generated key T A of size F s bits is stored in cache at each user k ∈ A. It is easy to see that this caching scheme fills the entire cache at each user. During the delivery phase, the transmissions are as follows. For
is transmitted. It is easy to check that the total number of bits transmitted is R keys avg F , where R keys avg is as in (1) . The decoding at any user k is successful, as each missing share of a demanded file at k is a summand in a transmission Y keys A for some (t+1)-sized subset A containing k. Any leakage of information from the cache is prevented by the secret sharing scheme, while leakage of information from the transmissions is prevented by the keys. For the purposes of this paper, the above presented coded caching scheme of [6] is referred to as the SCC keys scheme.
A. Intuition behind this work
In this paper, we present an improved perfectly secretive coded caching scheme for the same values of M as in (1) other than {1, N(K − 1)}. Our scheme has a lower average rate compared to (1) . To do this, we exploit the presence of commonality between demands of different users. For the original coded caching problem without any secrecy requirement, this was done in [2] .
In [2] , it was shown that in the original scheme of [1] , some transmissions are redundant, i.e., they can be obtained as linear combinations of other transmissions, for some instances of demand vectors. Thus, such transmissions can be 'saved', i.e., they need not be transmitted and hence lead to reduced average rate.
The question we raise is -Can we 'save' transmissions in the SCC keys scheme also? We notice that because of the presence of a unique key as a summand in each transmission of the SCC keys scheme, no transmission of SCC keys can obtained from other transmissions. Thus there cannot be any further reduction in the average rate if we use the SCC keys scheme as it is.
On the other hand, consider the minor modification to SCC Keys . In this modified scheme, which we shall henceforth call as the SCC keyless scheme, the transmissions are
In other words, compared to the SCC keys transmission scheme, the keys are not included as summands in the SCC keyless scheme. The cache content for the SCC keyless scheme remains the same as with the SCC keys scheme. Clearly, except for using shares in the place of subfiles, this is identical to the original scheme of [1] . Because of this similarity, as a direct consequence of Lemma 1 of [2] , we have the following lemma. We leave the details of the proof to the reader.
Lemma 1 suggests that the messages Y A for any nonleader (t + 1)-sized subset A need not be transmitted as it can be recovered from other transmissions, provided there is no violation of the secrecy constraint in the transmissions of SCC keyless (which depends on the demand vector d). However, the following example shows that SCC keyless ensures secrecy for some demand vectors, but results in leakage for others. Hence it is not a secretive scheme though the scheme lends itself to rate reduction by exploiting commonality of demands. respectively. However, the SCC keys scheme remains secure for the same demand vector, with all the above transmissions having the keys as the extra summand.
In Section IV of this work, a new secretive coded caching scheme is proposed which can be said to combine the advantages of the SCC keys scheme (in ensuring secrecy for all demand vectors) and the SCC keyless scheme (in enabling rate reduction by not transmitting redundant transmissions). For this purpose, we investigate the leakage properties of SCC keyless scheme in Section III.
III. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR LEAKAGE OF SHARES IN SCC keyless SCHEME For some user k and for a particular choice of demands at the K users, we use the notation E k to denote the set of all users which have the same demand as k. The following lemma is an observation which will be used to show the main result in this section. Lemma 2. Any two distinct transmissions Y X1 and Y X2 of the SCC keyless (for some (t + 1)-sized subsets X 1 , X 2 of [K]) scheme have at most one summand share in common, i.e., at most one share is eliminated in the sum Y X1 + Y X2 .
Proof: There is nothing to prove if there is no common share. Suppose there is a share common between Y X1 and Y X2 . Then there must be some x 1 ∈ X 1 , x 2 ∈ X 2 such that
. This means X 1 \x 1 = X 2 \x 2 . However this means that for any other x 1 = x 1 such that x 1 ∈ X 1 , we have X 1 \x 1 ⊂ X 2 . This concludes the proof.
Before we give the main result in this section, we define the notion of a leaked share of a given coded caching scheme over a secret sharing scheme as an outer code.
Definition 2 (Leaked shares). Let S be a coded caching scheme where the cache and transmissions are functions of the shares (from the secret sharing scheme) and keys, and X d be the set of transmissions of S for a particular choice of user demands d. For some t-sized subset X , a share S X n is said to be leaked to some user k from X d if n = d k , k / ∈ X and S X n is decodable from the set of transmissions X d .
The following theorem is the main result in this section which gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the leakage of a share at a user. 
Proof: If part: As X 1 is a (t + 1)-sized subset of [K], the SCC keyless scheme has a well-defined transmission
By the conditions given, we have a user k such that k / ∈ X 1 but k ∈ E x2 . To show that S X n is leaked to user k, it is sufficient to prove that there is a collection of transmissions whose sum results in a linear combination of the form
for some p ≥ 1 such that k ∈ X i , i = 1, .., p and n = d k and k / ∈ X (by Definition 2). We show that such a collection of transmissions does exist. Consider the set of transmissions Y Xj , where X j = (X 1 \x j ) ∪ k, j = 2, ..., t + 1. We write these transmissions explicitly as follows
We claim that the sum t+1 i=1 Y Xi is of the form (3). To see this, firstly we note that ∀j = 2, ..., t + 1, we have X j \k = X 1 \x j and k ∈ X j \x i , ∀i = j. Thus, all the shares whose index does not contain k are eliminated in the sum
which is the share that is to be leaked. Furthermore there are (t + 1) 2 − 1 shares (leaving out S X dx 1 ) totally considering all the transmissions Y Xj , j = 1, ..., t + 1. By Lemma 2, at most t(t + 1) shares are eliminated in their sum (including the shares whose indices do not contain k). Thus, at least one share remains whose index contains k. Hence, the sum t+1 i=1 Y Xi is of the form (3) with p ≥ 1. This proves the if part.
Only if part: With respect to Condition C1, note that if k ∈ X then the share is already present in the cache of k. Also, if there is no user x 1 such that n = d x1 , then the share S X n will not occur in any of the transmissions of SCC keyless scheme and there will thus be no possibility of its leakage. Finally if n = d k , then leakage would be a misnomer as W n is intended for k. Hence Condition C1 holds.
We give the rest of the proof in three stages.
Stage 1: Condition C1 holds, but Condition C2 doesn't hold:
Suppose there is a user k at which S X n is leaked. Then we must have d k = n and k / ∈ X (by Definition 2). Thus k / ∈ X 1 . We now prove by contradiction. For leakage, there should be some linear combination of the transmissions such that (3) is satisfied. Since no direct transmission is of the form in (3) (as k / ∈ X 1 and n = d k ), at least two transmissions have to be linearly combined to get (3) . Let a set of transmissions linearly combined to get (3) be denoted as C.
As Condition C1 holds, the transmission Y X1 is well defined as in (2) . We assume WLOG that the transmission Y X1 is such that in the linear combination of the transmissions in C leading to (3), the share S X n is not eliminated, but retained and thus leaked (clearly, such a transmission Y X1 must exist in C).
Since Condition C2 doesn't hold, we have d p (X ) = (t), there must be some y 1 
(4)
Note that, when Y X1 linearly combines with other transmissions in C to give (3), except for S y1∪X dx 1
, the other shares in (4) are necessarily eliminated because k / ∈ x 1 ∪ X and also k / ∈ X 1 \x for any x ∈ X.
For the purposes of this proof, we henceforth denote a share S x∪X dy as (d y , x, X ). In order to eliminate the share (d y1 , x 1 , X) in Y X1 , we need a transmission Y X2 ∈ C, with X 2 = X ∪ {x 1 , y 2 } with d y2 = d y1 . Obviously, we must have y 2 = y 1 as otherwise X 1 = X 2 .
In Y X1 + Y X2 , the share (d y1 , x 1 , X) = (d y2 , x 1 , X) gets eliminated, and no other share is eliminated as only at most one share is common between any two transmissions by Lemma 2. Thus, we now have at least one share (d x1 , y 2 , X) that has to be eliminated from (Y X1 + Y X2 ) for leakage to occur at user k (since k / ∈ (y 2 ∪ X) as k / ∈ E y2 = E y1 ). For the sake of this proof, we call the share (d x1 , y 2 , X) the paired share of the eliminated share (d y2 , x 1 , X) in Y X2 . In order to eliminate this paired share (d x1 , y 2 , X), we must have another transmission Y X3 ∈ C such that X 3 = X ∪ {x 2 , y 2 } with d x2 = d x1 but x 2 = x 1 . Clearly, the sets X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 are all distinct, and hence so are the transmissions Y Xi , i = 1, 2, 3.
Note that the paired share of (d x2 , y 2 , X) is (d y2 , x 2 , X), and this has to be eliminated again. We continue the process of picking transmissions from C such that the paired share at every step is eliminated (the stopping criterion being that the paired share is eliminated by a prior picked transmission, thus not requiring us to pick a new transmission from C). Because the number of transmissions is finite, the set C ⊆ C of transmissions including Y X1 picked to eliminate the paired shares is finite.
Let the last-picked transmission Y in C be Y X∪{xr,y r } for some r, r . Let the last but one transmission be Y . Let (d xr , y r , X) be the share eliminated in Y by adding with the previous transmission Y , and thus (d y r , x r , X) is its paired share (the other possibility is that the (d y r , x r , X) is the eliminated share in Y + Y , for which the proof proceeds similarly with only minor changes).
We claim that the paired share (d y r , x r , X) cannot be eliminated, thus contradicting the assumption that Y is the last-picked transmission. The proof is as follows. Note that any transmission of C prior to Y is of the form Y {xi,yj }∪X for some x i , y j . If (d y r , x r , X) is to cancel with any share in some such prior transmission Y {xi,yj }∪X of C (which should have been picked prior to Y by Lemma 2), then it must be that (d y r , x r , X) = (d yj , x i , X) or (d y r , x r , X) = (d xi , y j , X). No other share of Y {xi,yj }∪X can be equal to (d y r , x r , X).
Suppose Y {xi,yj }∪X = Y X1 and is picked prior to Y . Then the shares (d xi , y j , X) and (d yj , x i , X) are eliminated already by adding with the two transmissions picked just prior to and just after
Thus no share is available in all transmissions prior to Y to eliminate (d y r , x r , X), as all such shares are either eliminated already or must be preserved. This proves that C cannot be finite. This proves that Condition C2 should be satisfied for leakage.
Stage 2: Conditions C1,C2 hold, but not Condition C3 Suppose S X n is leaked to a user k from Y X1 . We are given that d p (X 1 ) = (t, 1) while d p (X ) = (t). Thus, we must have d p (X 1 ) = (t + 1), as this is the only other possibility. However since n = d k , we thus have {x 1 , y 1 } ∈ X 1 such that d x1 = d y1 = d k . The rest of the arguments for this stage follow that of Stage 1 (starting from the para with (4)). This proves that Condition C3 should also hold. = S X n is supposedly leaked to user k with d x1 = d k . As k / ∈ E x2 , there is at least one y 1 ∈ X such that y 1 = x 1 and d y1 = d k . Once again, we invoke the same arguments as Stage 1 (starting from the para with (4)) to complete the proof of this stage, showing that Condition 4 and hence the theorem should hold true.
IV. AN IMPROVED SECRETIVE CODED CACHING SCHEME
We now describe our improved secretive coded caching scheme, which we denote by SCC common . The parameters N, K and t (and hence M ) are as in Section II. For a given vector of users demands d, we have, as before, a set U of leaders consisting of N e (d) users with all the unique demands. The cache placement phase remains the same as SCC keys . After employing a ( K−1 t−1 , K t ) secret sharing scheme to convert the files into shares as in SCC keys (with each share being of size F s =
), the transmissions in the delivery phase are as follows.
Before proving that the SCC common scheme is secretive and showing the improved average rate of the scheme, we first obtain the number of transmissions in the scheme. Note that in the scheme, transmissions are made corresponding to each (t +1)-sized subset A of [K], except for those subsets of non-leaders (i.e A ⊆ [K]\U ) with d p (A) = (t, 1). By abuse of terminology, we think of these sets of non-leaders with d p (A) = (t, 1) as corresponding to saved transmissions, since corresponding to these sets also, transmissions are made in the SCC keys scheme. These saved transmissions translate to the reduced average rate of our scheme compared to SCC keys . In order to calculate the number of saved transmissions, we partition the set of non-leaders [K]\U into demand classes E i : i = 1, .., b, such that the demands of users in each class is the same. We now have the following result on the number of saved transmissions. For the proof, we only have to count the number (t + 1)-sized subsets A ⊆ [K]\U with d p (A) = (t, 1). This is straightforward, however an explicit proof is made available in [7] .
Lemma 3. The number of saved transmissions in the
where Δ t is as follows
. We now give our main theorem which establishes the rate of our scheme and shows that it enables secrecy (using Theorem 1) as well as correct decoding (using Lemma 1). Theorem 2. The SCC common scheme is a secretive coded caching scheme and it achieves an average rate
Proof: Firstly, we see that for successful decoding it is sufficient for the users to obtain transmissions either Y keys A or Y A for each (t + 1)-sized subset A of [K]. Now the only (t + 1)-sized subsets for which neither Y A nor Y keys A is available directly from the transmissions are those with d p (A) = (t, 1) and A ∩ U = φ. However, by Lemma 1, any such Y A is recoverable from transmissions Y Ai (which are included in SCC common ) such that A i ∩ U = φ, d(A i ) = d(A), and A i \A ⊆ U . This is because such Y Ai s are transmitted in the SCC common scheme without having keys as summands. Thus, the decoding is successful at all users. Note that by Theorem 1, for any transmission A of SCC keyless containing a leaked share, d p (A) = (t, 1). In SCC common , any such transmission has an independently generated key as a summand, restricting the decoding of the summand shares to only intended users in A. This completes the proof of secrecy. The achieved average rate is clear from Lemma 3 and the description of the scheme. Remark 1. The SCC keys scheme proposed by [6] has an average rate ( K t+1 )Fs F (the result in (1) is obtained by simplifying this expression). Our scheme has a better average rate than SCC keys as Δ t ≤ K−Ne(d) t+1 . Example 2. Let N = 10 and K = 10 and t = 2. Let the vector d = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3 ). Let us consider the set of leaders as U = {1, 6, 10} and so N e (d) = 3. The sets of users with same demands are E 1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, E 2 = {6, 7, 8, 9}, E 3 = {10}. There will be K t+1 = 120 transmissions in the SCC keys scheme, and all the transmissions are with keys. Now, to calculate the number of transmissions in SCC common scheme, we partition the non-leader set {2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9} into the demand classes E i , i = 1, 2, 3 with users with the same demand in each class, and obtain E 1 = {2, 3, 4, 5}, E 2 = {7, 8, 9}, E 3 = φ. Using Lemma 3, we obtain Δ t = = 35. Thus the number of saved transmissions compared to the SCC keys scheme is 5, and the SCC common scheme requires 115 transmissions. The transmissions of SCC common with keys correspond to all the subsets of [K] of size (t + 1) = 3 with demand profile (t, 1) = (2, 1). It is a simple counting argument to show that this is equal to 
